



**Brick Township  
Municipal Utilities Authority**

# Getting Hacked

Presented by:


Janice Zelnock, CGCIO

# **BTMUA Cyber Incident**

- 1. Events leading to cyber attack**
- 2. Informing officials/employees**
- 3. Keeping critical business functions running**
- 4. Virus containment and remediation**

# Day 1 - Spear Phishing

User opened suspicious email with 'Invoice.doc' attachment



## Day 2 – Cyber Fraud

- **Unauthorized charges**  
Employee Amazon accounts



**amazon.com**<sup>®</sup>

- **Unauthorized charges**  
BTMUA Staples account

- **Thousands of emails**  
**sent to Finance computer**



[www.jesperdeleuran.dk](http://www.jesperdeleuran.dk)

# Day 2 – Get Assistance



## McAfee Support

“Total Endpoint Threat Protection” - Identified ‘*Artemis*’ virus

How to we clean/remediate?



## Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)

Advice on cyber threat prevention, protection, response, recovery

Confirmed we are infected with **Emotet** trojan


# Day 2 – Emotet

## Most anti-virus programs do not detect Emotet

- Steals network usernames & passwords
- Steals outlook email contacts
- Steals confidential account credentials used for online payments and banking systems.
  - Credit card info used for online shopping (Amazon, Macys, Etsy, Staples)
  - Banking logon info (PNC, TD, CitiBank)



# Day 2 – Scope of Infection



# Day 2 - Black Friday

- Emotet is not cleanable
- Hackers in system now
- Shut down network now
- All infected Servers and PCs
  - **Restore** from backup  
or
  - **Wipe clean** (reload)



# Day 3 – Scope of Infection

## Devices

- 26 File Servers
- 120 user PCs



# Day 3 – Scope of Infection

## Programs

- Email, Excel, Word
- Finance, Billing
- LIMS (Laboratory Information Management system)
- **WIMS** (Water Information Management System)
- **Payroll**

# Day 3 – No breach of PII data

## SQL Databases

- Personal Identity Information (PII)
- Customer data
- Financial data
- LIMS, WIMS data



# Day 4 – Critical Functions

## Payroll

Everyone needs to get paid

## WIMS

T4 Operator of Record must file monthly reports with DEP

# Days 3-4 - Inform Officials/Executive Staff

## Conference Call

- Network will be down upcoming week
- Estimated time frame to recover
- **Critical Business functions up first**  
Payroll, Plant reporting (WIMS)



# Day 4

# *“Boots on the ground”*

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## **NJCCIC**


**New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell**

- Provide a team of trained network administrators
- Identified infected PCs
- Reload infected PCs

# Day 5 - NJCCIC



# Day 5 – Get Everyone Paid



INFECTED NETWORK



# Day 5 – Passwords

- **BTMUA network**

Force new password at next logon



- **Change personal passwords for accounts accessed at work**

Order status, Banking, Credit card

# Days 5-10 Remediation

## Team IT

Restored Servers using backups before Emotet infection

## Team NJCCIC

Restored / Reloaded infected user PCs



# Days 5–10

## How do we stop this from happening again?


### Prevention/Containment

- VLANs – Split the network into smaller sections
- Limit user ability to make changes to PC
- User awareness training

# Weeks 1 – 4 Getting Users back on the Network

## Team IT

- Added users one at a time
- Setup VLANs on the network
- Added each user to assigned VLAN



**BTMUA employee downtime  
10 days – 4 weeks**

# Week 5 - User Awareness Training

*Will I be the next person to click on an email containing a virus?*

- **In person staff training**  
Review of Emotet, cyber awareness session, how to identify malicious email
- **KnowBe4**  
Cloud service offering comprehensive ongoing user awareness training



# WHAT WE DID WRONG

## 1. Underestimated the hackers

- Hackers are extremely sophisticated
- Malware is available as 'open source'
- Free to all hackers
- Emotet used as carrier for other malware

# WHAT WE DID WRONG

## 2. Firewall/network vulnerabilities

- Windows firewalls not 'ON'
- Firewall logs not being saved beyond 24 hours
- No available firewall logs for the exact time when Emotet hit

# WHAT WE DID WRONG

## 3. Inadequate cyber security awareness training

- Provided basic training on what to look for in suspicious email
- Training not comprehensive

# WHAT WE DID RIGHT

## 1. Reliable, enterprise backup system

- Check backups daily
- Correct issues promptly
- Run test restores
- No data loss after Emotet



# WHAT WE DID RIGHT

## 2. Isolated critical systems behind a firewall

- SCADA system
- Building access system
- Surveillance cameras

# Conclusions

- Use an robust enterprise backup system
- Isolate critical systems behind a firewall
- Conduct user cyber security awareness training
- Employ expert, flexible IT staff
- Develop “Cyber Incident Response Plan”

# Your Cyber Incident Response Plan

Print and post in a prominent location

## 1. IT Team response

- Unplug user(s) from network (Limit scope of damage)
- Get printed copies – Current IT contacts & system/administrator credentials
- Determine what has happened (Identify Malware)
- Call anti-virus & firewall providers

## 2. Contact experts for assistance

- MS-ISAC - 866-787-4722, <https://www.cisecurity.org/isac/report-an-incident>
- NCCIC (DHS) - 888-282-0870, <https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident>
- NJCCIC (NJ only) - 609-963-6900 x7865, <https://www.cyber.nj.gov/report>
- WATER-ISAC (water/wastewater) - 866-426-4722, <https://www.waterisac.org/report-incident>

## 3. Business functions

- Which business functions are up /down?
- Identify critical business functions and how you will keep them running

## 4. Inform executives / elected officials

- Identify scope of the damage
- Time frame for each business function to be running again
- List steps IT is taking to remediate the problem

# Contact Information

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**Janice Zelnock, CGCIO**

**Supervisor of IT**

The Brick Township Municipal Utilities Authority

1551 Highway 88 West, Brick, NJ 08724

**voice: 732-701-4277**

**email: [janice@brickmua.com](mailto:janice@brickmua.com)**